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Abstract
Signcryption is a cryptographic primitive that fulfills
both the functions of digital signature and public key en-
cryption simultaneously, at a cost significantly lower than
that required by the traditional signature-then-encryption
approach. In this paper, we address a question whether it
is possible to construct a hybrid signcryption scheme in
identity-based setting. This question seems to have never
been addressed in the literature. We answer the question
positively in this paper. In particular, we extend the concept
of signcryption key encapsulation mechanism to the identity-
based setting. We show that an identity-based signcryption
scheme can be constructed by combining an identity-based
signcryption key encapsulation mechanism with a data en-
capsulation mechanism. We also give an example of identity-
based signcryption key encapsulation mechanism.
1. Introduction
Identity-based (ID-based) cryptography was introduced by
Shamir in 1984 [20]. The distinguishing property of ID-
based cryptography is that a user’s public key can be any
binary string, such as an email address that can identify
the user. This removes the need for senders to look up
the recipient’s public key before sending out an encrypted
message. ID-based cryptography is supposed to provide
a more convenient alternative to conventional public key
infrastructure. Several practical ID-based signature schemes
have been devised since 1984 but a satisfying ID-based
encryption scheme only appeared in 2001 [7]. It was devised
by Boneh and Franklin and cleverly uses bilinear maps (the
Weil or Tate pairing) over supersingular elliptic curves.
Confidentiality, integrity, non-repudiation and authentica-
tion are the important requirements for many cryptographic
applications. A traditional approach to achieve these require-
ments is to sign-then-encrypt the message. Signcryption,
first proposed by Zheng [22], is a cryptographic primitive
that fulfills both the functions of digital signature and
public key encryption simultaneously, at a cost significantly
lower than that required by the traditional signature-then-
encryption approach. The original scheme in [22] is based
on the discrete logarithm problem but no security proof is
given. Zheng’s original construction [22] was only proven
secure by Baek, Steinfeld, and Zheng [3] who described
a formal security model in a multi-user setting. A recent
direction is to merge the concepts of ID-based cryptography
and signcryption to design efficient ID-based signcryption
schemes. Several ID-based signcryption schemes have been
proposed so far, e.g. [4], [8], [9], [10], [16], [18], [19].
The practical way to perform secrecy communication for
large messages is to use hybrid encryption that separates
the encryption into two parts: one part uses public key
techniques to encrypt a one-time symmetric key; the other
part uses the symmetric key to encrypt the actual message.
In such a construction, the public key part of the algorithm
is known as the key encapsulation mechanism (KEM) while
the symmetric key part is known as the data encapsulation
mechanism (DEM). A formal treatment of this paradigm
originates in the work of Cramer and Shoup [11]. The re-
sulting KEM-DEM hybrid encryption paradigm has received
much attention in recent years [1], [14], [15]. It is very
attractive as it gives a clear separation between the various
parts of the cipher allowing for modular design. In [1], Abe,
Gennaro, and Kurosawa introduced tag-KEM which takes as
input a tag in KEM. Bentahar et al’s [5] extended KEM
into identity-based setting and proposed several efficient
constructions of ID-based KEM (ID-KEM).
The use of hybrid techniques to build signcryption
schemes has been studied by Dent [12], [13]. He generalized
KEM to signcryption KEM which includes an authentication
in KEM. However, he only consider the insider security for
authenticity. That is, if the sender’s private key is exposed, an
attacker is able to recover the key generated by signcryption
KEM. The full insider security [2] means that (a) if the
sender’s private key is exposed, an attacker is still not able
to recover the message from the ciphertext and (b) if the
receiver’s private key is exposed, an attacker is still not able
to forge a ciphertext. In 2006, Bjørstad and Dent [6] showed
how to built signcryption schemes using tag-KEM. However,
they also only consider the insider security for authenticity
and not for confidentiality. In 2008, Tan [21] proposed
full insider secure signcryption KEM and tag-KEM without
random oracles (in the standard model). Tan’s schemes are
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insider secure for both authenticity and confidentiality.
All the above hybrid signcryption schemes [12], [13], [6],
[21] is not ID-based. In this paper, we address a question
whether it is possible to construct a hybrid signcryption
scheme in ID-based setting. This question seems to have
never been addressed in the literature. We answer the
question positively in this paper. In particular, we extend
the concept of signcryption KEM to the ID-based setting.
We show that an ID-based signcryption scheme can be
constructed by combining an ID-based signcryption KEM
(IDSC-KEM) with a DEM. We also give an example of ID-
based signcryption KEM. Our schemes are insider secure
for both authenticity and confidentiality.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. We intro-
duce the preliminary work in Section 2. We give the formal
model of ID-based signcryption KEM in Section 3. We show
how to construct an ID-based signcryption scheme using
an ID-based signcryption KEM and a DEM in Section 4.
An example of ID-based signcryption KEM is described in
Section 5. Finally, the conclusions are given in Section 6.
2. Preliminaries
2.1. ID-Based Signcryption (IDSC)
A generic ID-based signcryption scheme consists of the
following four algorithms.
• Setup : is a probabilistic polynomial-time (PPT) algo-
rithm run by a private key generator (PKG) that takes
as input 1k and outputs a master public key mpk and a
master secret key msk. Here k is a security parameter.
• Extract : is a key generation algorithm run by the PKG
that takes as input the master secret key msk and an
identity ID ∈ {0, 1}∗, and outputs the corresponding
private key SID.
• Signcrypt : is a PPT algorithm that takes as input
a plaintext message m, a receiver’s identity IDr, and
a sender’s private key SIDS , and outputs a ciphertext
σ ← Signcrypt(m,SIDs , IDr).
• Unsigncrypt : is a deterministic algorithm that takes
as input a ciphertext σ, the receiver’s private key SIDr
and the sender’s identity IDs, and outputs the original
message m or the symbol ⊥ if σ is an invalid ciphertext
between identities IDs and IDr.
We make the consistency constraint that if
σ ← Signcrypt(m,SIDs , IDr),
then
m ← Unsigncrypt(σ, SIDr , IDs).
Malone-Lee [19] defines the security notions for ID-
based signcryption schemes. These notions are semantic
security (i.e. indistinguishability against adaptive chosen ci-
phertext attacks (IND-CCA2) and existential unforgeability
against adaptive chosen messages attacks (UF-CMA)). For
the stronger notion of insider security, we use the notion
of strong existential unforgeability (sUF-CMA). The strong
existential unforgeability means that an adversary wins if
it outputs a valid message/signcryption pair (m,σ) for
identities IDs and IDr and the signcryption σ was not
returned by the signcryption oracle when queried on the
message m.
For the confidentiality, we consider the following game
played between a challenger C and an adversary A.
• Initial : The challenger C runs (mpk,msk) ←
Setup(1k) and runs A on input (1k,mpk).
• Phase1 : The adversary A can perform a polynomially
bounded number of queries in an adaptive manner (that is,
each query may depend on the responses to the previous
queries).
– Key extraction queries: A chooses an identity ID. C
computes SID ← Extract(ID) and sends SID to A.
– Signcryption queries: A produces a sender’s identity
IDs, a receiver’s identity IDr and a plaintext m. C
computes the private key SIDs ← Extract(IDs) and
σ ← Signcrypt(m,SIDs , IDr) and sends σ to A.
– Unsigncryption queries: A chooses a sender’s identity
IDs, a receiver’s identity IDr, and a ciphertext σ. C
generates the private key SIDr ← Extract(IDr) and
sends the result of Unsigncrypt(σ, SIDr , IDs) to A.
• Challenge : The adversary A decides when Phase 1
ends. A generates two equal length plaintexts m0,m1,
a sender’s identity ID∗s , and a receiver’s identity ID∗r on
which it wishes to be challenged. The identity ID∗r should
not appear in any key extraction queries in Phase 1. The
challenger C picks a random bit δ from {0, 1}, computes
σ∗ ← Signcrypt(mδ, SID∗s , ID∗r ), and returns σ to A.
• Phase2 : The adversary A can ask a polynomially
bounded number of queries adaptively again as in Phase
1 with the restriction that it cannot make a key extraction
query on ID∗r and cannot make an unsigncryption query
on σ∗ to obtain the corresponding plaintext.
• Guess : The adversary A produces a bit δ′ and wins the
game if δ′ = δ.
The advantage of A is defined to be
AdvIND−CCA2IDSC (A) = |2Pr[δ′ = δ]− 1|,
where Pr[δ′ = δ] denotes the probability that δ′ = δ.
Definition 1: An ID-based signcryption scheme is con-
sidered to be IND-CCA2 secure, if for all PPT adversaries
A, the advantage in the IND-CCA2 game is a negligible
function of the security parameter k.
Notice that the adversary is allowed to make a key
extraction query on identity ID∗s in the above definition.
This condition corresponds to the stringent requirement of
insider security for confidentiality of signcryption [2]. On the
other hand, it ensures the forward security of the scheme,
535
i.e. confidentiality is preserved in case the sender’s private
key becomes compromised.
For the strong existential unforgeability, we consider the
following game played between a challenger C and an
adversary F .
• Initial : The challenger C runs (mpk,msk) ←
Setup(1k) and runs F on input (1k,mpk).
• Attack : The adversary F performs a polynomially
bounded number of queries just like in the confidentiality
game.
• Forgery : F produces a quaternion (m∗, σ∗, ID∗s , ID∗r ),
where the private key of ID∗s was not asked and σ∗
was not returned by the signcryption oracle on the input
(m∗, ID∗s , ID
∗
r ) during Attack stage. F wins the game
if the result of Unsigncrypt(σ∗, SID∗r , ID
∗
s) is not the
⊥ symbol.
The advantage of F is defined as the probability that it wins.
Definition 2: An ID-based signcryption scheme is consid-
ered to be sUF-CMA secure, if for all PPT adversaries F ,
the advantage in the sUF-CMA game is a negligible function
of the security parameter k.
Note that the adversary is allowed to make a key extrac-
tion query on the identity ID∗r in the above definition. Again,
this condition corresponds to the stringent requirement of
insider security for authenticity of signcryption [2].
2.2. Date Encapsulation Mechanism (DEM)
A DEM is a symmetric encryption scheme which consists
of the following two algorithms.
• Enc : is a deterministic encryption algorithm which takes
as input 1k, a key K and a message m ∈ {0, 1}∗, and
outputs a ciphertext c ∈ {0, 1}∗, where K ∈ KDEM is
a key in the given key space, and m is a bit string of
arbitrary length. We denote this as c ← Enc(K,m).
• Dec : is a deterministic decryption algorithm which takes
as input a key K and a ciphertext c, and outputs the
message m ∈ {0, 1}∗ or a symbol ⊥ to indicate that the
ciphertext is invalid.
For the purposes of this paper, it is only required that a
DEM is secure with respect to indistinguishability against
passive attackers (IND-PA). Formally, this security notion
is captured by the following game played between a PPT
adversary A and a challenger C.
• Initial : A runs on input 1k and submits two equal
length messages, m0 and m1.
• Challenge : C chooses a random key K ∈ KDEM as well
as a random bit λ ∈ {0, 1}, and sends c∗ ← Enc(K,mλ)
to A as a challenge ciphertext.
• Guess : The adversary A produces a bit λ′ and wins the
game if λ′ = λ.
The advantage of A is defined to be
AdvIND−PADEM (A) = |2Pr[λ′ = λ]− 1|,
where Pr[λ′ = λ] denotes the probability that λ′ = λ.
Definition 3: A DEM is considered to be IND-PA secure,
if for all PPT adversaries A, the advantage in the above game
is a negligible function of the security parameter k.
3. ID-Based Signcryption KEM
In this section, we give the formal definition for ID-based
signcryption KEM.
3.1. Generic Scheme
A generic ID-based signcryption KEM consists of the
following four algorithms.
• Setup : is a PPT algorithm which takes as input 1k and
outputs the master public key mpk and the master secret
key msk. Here k is a security parameter.
• Extract : is a key generation algorithm which takes as
input msk and an identity ID ∈ {0, 1}∗, and outputs the
corresponding private key SID.
• Encap : is a PPT key encapsulation algorithm which takes
as input a plaintext message m, a receiver’s identity IDr,
and a sender’s private key SIDs , and outputs an encapsu-
lation key pair (K,ψ), where K ∈ KIDSC−KEM is a key
in the space of possible session keys at a given security
level, and ψ ∈ EIDSC−KEM is the encapsulation of that
key. We denote this as (K,ψ)← Encap(m,SIDs , IDr).
• Decap : is a deterministic key decapsulation algorithm
which takes as input the sender’s identity IDs, the re-
ceiver’s private key SIDr and the encapsulation of that
key ψ, and outputs the corresponding key K or the error
symbol ⊥. We denote this as K ← Decap(ψ, SIDr , IDs).
• Verify : is a deterministic verification algorithm which
takes as input a sender’s identity IDs, a receiver’s private
key SIDr , a message m, and an encapsulation ψ, and
outputs  for “true” or ⊥ for “false”. Note that the
verification algorithm does not need to take the symmetric
key K as input as it can be easily computed from the
encapsulation ψ using the deterministic decapsulation
algorithm.
We make the consistency constraint that if
(K,ψ)← Encap(m,SIDs , IDr),
then
K ← Decap(ψ, SIDr , IDs)and ← Verify(ψ,m, SIDr , IDs).
3.2. Security Notions
An ID-based signcryption KEM should satisfy confiden-
tiality and unforgeability. For the confidentiality, we consider
the following game played between a challenger C and an
adversary A.
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• Initial : The challenger C runs (mpk,msk) ←
Setup(1k) and runs A on input (1k,mpk).
• Phase1 : The adversary A can perform a polynomially
bounded number of queries in an adaptive manner (that is,
each query may depend on the responses to the previous
queries).
– Key extraction queries: A chooses an identity ID. C
computes SID ← Extract(ID) and sends SID to A.
– Key encapsulation queries: A produces a sender’s iden-
tity IDs, a receiver’s identity IDr and a plaintext m. C
computes the private key SIDs ← Extract(IDs) and
(K,ψ) ← Encap(m,SIDs , IDr) and sends (K,ψ) to
A.
– Key decapsulation queries: A chooses a sender’s
identity IDs, a receiver’s identity IDr, and an
encapsulation ψ. C generates the private key
SIDr ← Extract(IDr) and sends the result of
Decap(ψ, SIDr , IDs) to A.
– Verification queries: A chooses a sender’s identity
IDs, a receiver’s identity IDr, a message m, and
an encapsulation ψ. C generates the private key
SIDr ← Extract(IDr) and sends the result of
Verify(ψ,m, SIDr , IDs) to A.
• Challenge : The adversary A decides when Phase 1
ends. A generates a message m∗, a sender’s identity
ID∗s , and a receiver’s identity ID∗r on which it wishes
to be challenged. The identity ID∗r should not ap-
pear in any key extraction queries in Phase 1. C then
runs (K1, ψ∗) ← Encap(m,SID∗s , ID∗r ) and randomly
chooses K0 ← KIDSC−KEM. C also chooses a random
bit b ∈ {0, 1} and sends (Kb, ψ∗) to A as a challenge
encapsulation key pair.
• Phase2 : The adversary A can ask a polynomially
bounded number of queries adaptively again as in Phase
1 with the restriction that it cannot make a key extraction
query on ID∗r and cannot make a decapsulation query on
(Kb, ψ∗) to obtain the corresponding key.
• Guess : The adversary A produces a bit b′ and wins the
game if b′ = b.
The advantage of A is defined to be
AdvIND−CCA2IDSC−KEM(A) = |2Pr[b′ = b]− 1|,
where Pr[b′ = b] denotes the probability that b′ = b.
Definition 4: An ID-based signcryption KEM is consid-
ered to be IND-CCA2 secure, if for all PPT adversaries
A, the advantage in the IND-CCA2 game is a negligible
function of the security parameter k.
For the unforgeability, we consider the following game
played between a challenger C and an adversary F .
• Initial : The challenger C runs (mpk,msk) ←
Setup(1k) and runs F on input (1k,mpk).
• Attack : The adversary F performs a polynomially
bounded number of queries just like in the confidentiality
game.
• Forgery : F produces a quaternion (m∗, ψ∗, ID∗s , ID∗r ),
where the private key of ID∗s was not asked and ψ∗ was
not returned by the key encapsulation oracle on the input
(m∗, ID∗s , ID
∗
r ) during Attack stage. F wins the game
if the result of Verify(ψ∗,m∗, SID∗r , ID
∗
s) is not the ⊥
symbol.
The advantage of F is defined as the probability that it wins.
Definition 5: An ID-based signcryption KEM is consid-
ered to be sUF-CMA secure, if for all PPT adversaries F ,
the advantage in the sUF-CMA game is a negligible function
of the security parameter k.
4. Identity-Based Hybrid Signcryption
We can combine an ID-based signcryption KEM with a
DEM to form an ID-based hybrid signcryption scheme. We
describe it in Figure 1.
Setup : On input 1k:
1. (mpk,msk)← IDSC− KEM.Setup(1k)
2. Output the master public key mpk and the master
secret key msk
Extract : On input the master secret key msk and
an identity ID ∈ {0, 1}∗:
1. SID ← IDSC− KEM.Extract(msk, ID)
2. Output the private key SID of the identity ID
Signcrypt : On input the sender’s private key SIDs ,
the receiver’s identity IDr, and a message m ∈ {0, 1}∗:
1. (K,ψ)← IDSC− KEM.Encap(m,SIDs , IDr)
2. c ← DEM.Enc(K,m)
3. Output the ciphertext σ ← (ψ, c)
Unsigncrypt : On input the sender’s identity IDs,
the receiver private key SIDr and the ciphertext σ:
1. K ← IDSC− KEM.Decap(ψ, SIDr , IDs)
2. If K = ⊥, then output ⊥ and stop
3. m ← DEM.Dec(K, c)
4. If  ← IDSC− KEM.Verify(ψ,m, SIDr , IDs),
output m. Otherwise output ⊥.
Figure 1. Identity-based hybrid signcryption
We give the security results for ID-based hybrid signcryp-
tion in Theorems 1 and 2
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Theorem 1: Let IDSC be an ID-based hybrid signcryption
scheme constructed from an ID-based signcryption KEM
and a DEM. If the ID-based signcryption KEM is IND-
CCA2 secure and the DEM is IND-PA secure, then IDSC
is IND-CCA2 secure. In particular, we have
AdvIND−CCA2IDSC (A) ≤ 2AdvIND−CCA2IDSC−KEM(B1)+AdvIND−PADEM (B2).
Proof: See the full paper [17].
Theorem 2: Let IDSC be an ID-based hybrid signcryption
scheme constructed from an ID-based signcryption KEM
and a DEM. If the ID-based signcryption KEM is sUF-CMA
secure, then IDSC is sUF-CMA secure. In particular, we
have
AdvsUF−CMAIDSC (F) ≤ AdvsUF−CMAIDSC−KEM(B),
where AdvsUF−CMAIDSC (F) is the advantage of the sUF-CMA
adversary against IDSC, and AdvsUF−CMAIDSC−KEM(B) is the ad-
vantage of the resulting sUF-CMA adversary against ID-
based signcryption KEM.
Proof: See the full paper [17].
5. An Example of ID-Based Signcryption KEM
Most of ID-based signcryption schemes [4], [8], [9], [10],
[16], [18], [19] fit the new generic framework. Here we
give an example of ID-based signcryption KEM based on
Barreto et al.’s scheme [4]. Barreto et al.’s scheme is the
fastest ID-based signcryption scheme so far. If we combine
the ID-based signcryption KEM with a DEM as Figure 1,
we can get a scheme that is very similar to Barreto et
al.’s original scheme. Since Barreto et al.’s scheme uses the
bilinear pairings, we first describe the basic definition and
properties of the bilinear pairings.
5.1. Bilinear Pairings
Let G1, G2 and GT be three cyclic groups of prime order
q. Let P , Q be generators of G1 and G2, respectively. A
bilinear pairing is a map eˆ : G1 × G2 → GT with the
following properties:
1) Bilinearity: ∀(S, T ) ∈ G1 × G2, ∀a, b ∈ Zq,
eˆ(aS, bT ) = eˆ(S, T )ab.
2) Non-degeneracy: ∀S ∈ G1, eˆ(S, T ) = 1 for all T ∈
G2 iff S = O.
3) Computability: ∀(S, T ) ∈ G1 × G2, eˆ(S, T ) is effi-
ciently computable.
4) There exists an efficient, publicly computable (but not
necessarily invertible) isomorphism ϕ : G2 → G1
such that ϕ(Q) = P .
The security of Barreto et al.’s scheme relies on the
hardness of the following problems.
Definition 6: Define G1, G2, GT and eˆ as in this sec-
tion. The l-Strong Diffie-Hellman problem (l-SDHP) in the
groups (G1, G2) is to find a pair (c, 1c+αP ) with c ∈ Z∗q
given a (l + 2)-tuple (P,Q, αQ,α2Q, . . . , αlQ).
Definition 7: Define G1, G2, GT and eˆ as in this section.
The l-Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Inversion problem (l-BDHIP)
in the groups (G1, G2, GT ) is to compute eˆ(P,Q)1/α ∈ GT
given (P,Q, αQ,α2Q, . . . , αlQ).
5.2. ID-Based Signcryption KEM
• Setup : Define G1, G2, GT and eˆ as in previous sub-
section. Let H1, H2 and H3 be three cryptographic hash
functions where H1 : {0, 1}∗ → Z∗q , H2 : {0, 1}∗×GT →
Z∗q and H3 : GT → {0, 1}n. Here n is the key length of a
DEM. Let Q ∈ G2, P = ϕ(Q) ∈ G1 be generators of G2
and G1, respectively and g = eˆ(P,Q) ∈ GT . The PKG
chooses a master secret key s ∈ Z∗q randomly and com-
putes Qpub ← sQ ∈ G2. The PKG publishes system para-
meters {G1, G2, GT , P,Q, g,Qpub, eˆ, ϕ,H1,H2,H3} and
keeps the master key s secret.
• Extract : Given an identity ID, the PKG computes the
private key SID ← 1H1(ID)+sQ ∈ G2. Then PKG sends
the private key to its owner in a secure way.
• Encap : Given a message m, a receiver’s identity IDr
and a sender’s private key SIDs , this algorithm works as
follows.
1) Choose x ∈ Z∗q randomly and compute r ← gx.
2) Compute K ← H3(r).
3) Compute h ← H2(m, r).
4) Compute S ← (x+ h)ϕ(SIDs).
5) Compute T ← x(H1(IDr)P + ϕ(Qpub)).
6) Set ψ ← (S, T ).
7) Output (K,ψ).
• Decap : Given the sender’s identity IDs, the receiver’s
private key SIDr , and an encapsulation ψ, this algorithm
works as follows.
1) Compute r ← eˆ(T, SIDr ).
2) Compute K ← H3(r).
3) Output K.
• Verify : Given the sender’s identity IDs, the receiver’s
private key SIDr , a message m, and an encapsulation ψ,
this algorithm works as follows.
1) Compute r ← eˆ(T, SIDr ).
2) Compute h ← H2(m, r).
3) If r = eˆ(S,H1(IDs)Q + Qpub)g−h, output symbol
. Otherwise, output symbol ⊥.
In a real implementation of this algorithm, we can store
the value of r computed by the decapsulation algorithm
and use it again in the verification algorithm. Such an
implementation would be functionally identical to the above
algorithm and would therefore be just as secure. We choose
to separate the decapsulation and verification algorithms so
that they can be studied independently. The security proof
is similar to that of [4]. We omit it.
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6. Conclusions
In this paper, we extended the concept of signcryption
KEM to the identity-based setting. We showed that an ID-
based signcryption scheme can be constructed by combining
an ID-based signcryption KEM with a DEM. To show that
our framework is reasonable, we also gave an example of
ID-based signcryption KEM based on Barreto et al.’s ID-
based signcryption scheme.
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